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Darwinism and its Discontents, by Michael Ruse. Cambridge University
Press, 2006. 290 pages + references + index. Cloth $30.00.
ANGUS MENUGE, Concordia University Wisconsin
In an earlier work—Can a Darwinian be a Christian?—Ruse argued that
someone fully committed to Darwinism could consistently embrace much
of the Christian faith. While Ruse expected a mixed response, he was surprised that some agreed with his thesis but could not see “how any rightthinking person could be a Darwinian” (p. ix). Ruse presents the current
volume as a “prequel” to the earlier work, giving the strongest possible
reasons to embrace a thoroughgoing Darwinism. By “thoroughgoing,” I
mean that Ruse, like Daniel Dennett, is a reductionist philosopher who
believes that the Darwinian perspective is a universal acid, transforming
our understanding of everything. Yet Ruse is markedly more generous to
dissenters than some other Darwinists. Although he claims that “All of the
critics of Darwinism are deeply mistaken” (p. 4), Ruse takes pains to consider and reply to their objections, making reasonable concessions along
the way. For this reason—and also because of his encyclopedic grasp of
the history of the origins debate—Ruse is, for my money, a more effective
apologist for Darwinism than either Dennett or Richard Dawkins.
Ruse begins (chap. 1) by arguing that Darwin truly is a significant figure responsible for a major scientific revolution. This claim is disputed
by historians of science, both because there were other significant evolutionists (such as Denis Diderot and Darwin’s Grandfather Erasmus), and
because Darwin’s main contribution—the idea of natural selection—was
resoundingly rejected by most of his contemporaries. Ruse points out
that Darwin’s claim to fame rests on three main achievements. First, he
discovered some very important evidences for evolution, including the
marked differences between island and continental species, and the ability
of animal and plant breeders to produce new forms of crops and livestock.
Secondly, he applied William Whewell’s idea of “consilience” to these and
a large range of other facts, including similarities between the structure
and embryos of different creatures, arguing they all point to descent with
modification from common ancestors. Lastly, inspired by Malthus’s observations about the “struggle for existence,” he proposed a mechanism—
natural selection—that removed final causes from biology.
Ruse concedes that most people who embraced evolution did not accept natural selection, because they were wedded to an idea of progress
that implies a direction to the unfolding of life: “most people did not want
to see evolution as . . . a straight scientific theory. . . . They were far more
interested in exploiting its potential as a kind of alternative to religion”
(p. 18). Darwin failed to found “a professionally based area of biological
science” (p. 24), yet, Ruse argues, Darwin’s revolution was merely delayed
until its synthesis with modern population genetics in the 1930s, often
called “neo-Darwinism.”
Biographical credits over, Ruse gets down to the serious business of
defending neo-Darwinism. He first argues for the fact of evolution (chap.
2), by which he means that “organisms came from other forms . . . by a
process or processes that are entirely natural, that is to say, governed
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by and only by unguided regularities or laws” p. (25). Alas, right here,
and also in his discussion of methodological naturalism (pp. 47–51),
Ruse unhelpfully identifies naturalism with materialism and supposes
that the only alternative to unguided laws (materialism) is interventionist supernaturalism (miracles), and therefore that Intelligent Design is a
misguided science of the supernatural. Of course almost everyone agrees
that invoking miracles has limited or no value in science proper. But
the alternative to “unguided regularities or laws” need not be miracles.
Nature itself may contain goal-directed processes—precisely Aristotle’s
view of embryogenesis. And even a theist who believes in intelligent design can maintain that the designer normally works through the means
of physical processes.
To see the problem, consider a carpet with an exquisite pattern. If someone infers intelligent design, he is not refuted by the discovery that the
carpet derived from an automatic Jacquard loom employing a mindless
punched card instead of an intelligent human operator. He can note that
the carpet reflects the design of the highly improbable pattern (specification) contained in the card, with the intelligent designers lying further
back. The fact that the loom operated naturally (no miracles are required
to explain the carpet) is perfectly consistent with its products being the
results of intelligent guidance. Likewise, the fact that natural laws seem
in themselves unguided won’t show that they are. They may result in
complex intelligent life only because of the fine-tuning of the fundamental
laws and constants of physics. Since design can be inferred without invoking miracles (as it is by fine-tuning arguments), Ruse is mistaken to contrast unguided laws with supernatural intervention and makes Intelligent
Design a weaker opponent than it needs to be.
Leaving aside methodology, what about the facts? Ruse points out (p.
28) that dog breeders have shown a remarkable degree of morphological
plasticity within Canis familiaris (the domesticated dog). Ruse concedes
that no new species is produced—“All dogs are interfertile” (p. 32). Actually, the example is even less impressive, because all breeding actually
does is shuffle existing genes so that previously recessive genes are now
expressed—it does not generate novel genetic information. Although there
is good indirect evidence of speciation, the observable examples of evolution, such as the resistance of bacteria to antibiotics, only demonstrate
microevolution (variation within species), not transitions between higher
biological kinds (macroevolution). Of course, no-one is able to observe
“change of the reptile-into-bird, hippopotamus-into-whale, monkey-intohuman kind” (p. 33). But although indirect, Ruse argues that the case is
still strong as an “inference to the best explanation” (p. 37).
There are methodological and factual worries about this claim. Methodologically, inference to the best explanation is competitive and is only
compelling if all reasonable explanations are considered, but because he
mischaracterizes it, Ruse does not seriously consider Intelligent Design
as competition. Then there are the facts. Ruse cites the fossil record (further discussed in chap. 4) and notes the apparent progression from lower
kinds like amphibians to higher kinds like mammals and humans, and the
evidence for transitions such as the apparent stages of horse evolution.
However, at the level of phyla, which distinguish organisms in terms of
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fundamental body plan, there are two major problems. First, most of the
phyla of living animals appear abruptly in the Cambrian explosion, not
gradually as Darwinism predicts. Secondly, while there are some plausible examples of transitions among lower biological kinds, they are absent
at the higher levels. As Wells and Dembski point out, this is a problem for
the Darwinian view, because “for every link connecting minor divisions
there should be hundreds connecting major divisions.”1
Ruse also appeals to homologies (similar structures in different creatures) as evidence of common ancestry, but later admits that “There are
repeated examples of convergence, of organisms of very different backgrounds and ancestries nevertheless finding their way into almost identical niches . . . with almost identical adaptations” (p. 201). Evidently,
structural similarity does not by itself show common ancestry. He notes
similarities between different creatures’ embryos (p. 42), but later admits
that Haeckel’s famous drawings were doctored: “Instead of showing actual drawings from life, he used . . . some of the same illustrations to show
embryos of organisms very different” (p. 221). To the charge by embryologist Jonathan Wells that the embryos start out very different and only
converge later before diverging again, Ruse responds that this “needs
explaining and evolution is the only viable naturalistic explanation” (p.
224). But since design has wrongly been excluded as supernaturalist,
this is unconvincing. Ruse also cites vestigial organs. Some examples are
controversial, e.g., it seems the appendix provides a reserve of “bacteria
essential for digestion,” in case they are eliminated by cholera or dysentery.2 But some are clear, e.g., the nubs of eyeless fish and salamanders.
All these examples show, however, is the role of selection in removing
useless function; they provide no evidence that selection can build eyes
in the first place.
Ruse has a trump-card. Scientists have discovered a special set of
genes—“Hox genes”— that account for the placement of body parts in
bilaterians (organisms that are the same on both sides). These Hox genes
make very similar proteins in frogs, fish, flies, mice and humans—surely
a proof of common descent. But Dembski and Wells point out that despite the similarities in genes, there are great differences in the organisms
themselves: “Precisely because homeotic genes are universal they cannot
explain the differences in organisms due to macroevolutionary change.”3
This takes us to the most important issue (discussed in chaps. 5 and 6),
the argument that natural selection is the main cause of biological variation. As evidence, Ruse cites an impressive case of artificial selection (alcohol tolerance in fruitflies), Darwin’s finches, and rings of subspecies such
as the greenish warbler complex. None of these examples shows how a
new adaptation or body plan arises in the first place, so Ruse reverts to
consilience. However, even Richard Dawkins admits the huge gaps between functional body plans: “living creatures are islands of viability
William A. Dembski and Jonathan Wells, The Design of Life (Dallas, TX: The
Foundation for Thought and Ethics, 2008), p. 73.
2
Barbara Miller, “Scientists discover true function of appendix organ,” available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/10/10/2055374.htm
3
Dembski and Wells, The Design of Life, p. 49.
1

BOOK REVIEWS

467

separated from other islands by gigantic oceans of grotesque deformity.”4
How can one viable creature be gradually transformed into another, since
most changes are lethal and any that are not cannot be coordinated by topdown design? The best source of empirical data, human interaction with
malaria, is not encouraging. As Michael Behe documents in The Edge of
Evolution, most humans have achieved resistance to malaria by a mutation
that deforms hemoglobin and which may lead to sickle-cell anemia, not
by the development of a more sophisticated immune system. And there
is increasing evidence from developmental biology that DNA mutation
cannot explain macroevolution. For example, Newman and Müller argue
that the organization of body plans cannot be explained purely by genes
because “phenotypic outcomes persist despite extensive derangement in
lines of ‘program code.’” They claim that “neo-Darwinism has no theory of
the generative. As a consequence, current evolutionary theory can predict
what will be maintained, but not what will appear.”5 Epigenetic factors—
factors outside of genes—are increasingly recognized as dominant in development, and it is these that must change to produce new body plans.
Other chapters include recent speculations on the origin of life (chap. 3)
and human evolution (chap. 7), and the impact of Darwinism on philosophy (especially epistemology and ethics), literature and religion (chaps.
10–12). And there are two admirably self-critical chapters on whether any
of this is really true (chaps. 8 and 9). Ruse admits that some of the standard
evidence for Darwinism is not as strong as some claim, but this, combined
with his positive arguments, only makes his case more credible. Although
this reviewer has indicated areas of skepticism, he is happy to recommend
Ruse’s book as one of the strongest recent defenses of Darwinism.
4
Richard Dawkins, The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Evolution
(New York: Mariner Books, 2005), p. 445.
5
Gerd B. Müller and Stuart A. Newman, Origination of Organismal Form (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003 ), pp. 6–7.

Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief,
by John Bishop. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. 250, $65.00.
BRENDAN SWEETMAN, Rockhurst University
This book addresses “a core issue in the epistemology of religious belief,”
the question of whether or not religious beliefs are epistemically justified,
by attempting to progress beyond what the author regards as the current
standoff between theists and atheists. Bishop takes seriously what he calls
the “evidential ambiguity” that leaves open the question of God’s existence, and responds by offering us a meticulously developed, indeed intriguing, modest form of fideism, inspired by the views of William James.
Although the argument of the book is detailed and quite technical (perhaps unnecessarily so for what the book ultimately says), Bishop provides
plenty of summary comment and a comprehensive glossary to aid readers

